Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 43
Number 2 Summer 2021

Article 3

Summer 2021

Race in the Courthouse: Less Protection as More Equal Protection
for Musical Works
Charles Cronin

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the
Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles Cronin, Race in the Courthouse: Less Protection as More Equal Protection for Musical Works, 43
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2021).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol43/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized
editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Race in the Courthouse:
Less Protection as More Equal Protection for
Musical Works
By CHARLES CRONIN*

INTRODUCTION
During the past decade or so, stakeholders in the United States popular
music sector have become rattled by the possibility of defending themselves
against music copyright infringement allegations based on insignificant
similarities, or even merely stylistic commonalities, between two musical
works. Marquee pop performers like Pharrell Williams, Katy Perry, Ed
Sheeran, Taylor Swift, and Led Zeppelin are among many popular musicians
who have defended themselves against such claims, attesting the industry’s
rueful maxim: “Have a hit, get a writ.”1 This unease among popular
songwriters developed over several decades as courts and jurors became
increasingly sympathetic towards infringement allegations involving
musical works that could not be considered “copies” of an earlier work under
any normative understanding of that term.2
In 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict that
“Blurred Lines,” a hit by Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams, infringed
Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give it Up.”3 Many musicians and copyright experts

* B.M., Oberlin; J.D., American Univ.; M.A., Ph.D., Stanford;

M.A. Info Systems,
Berkeley. Charles Cronin is a Visiting Scholar at George Washington University Law
School, and Adjunct Professor at Keck Graduate Institute, Claremont Colleges.
1 See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018); Gray v. Perry, No.
2:15-cv-05642-CAS (JCX), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113807, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 5,
2019); Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 17 Civ. 5221 (LLS), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52908, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020); Hall v. Swift, 786 F. App’x 711, 711 (9th Cir. 2019); Skidmore
v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2020).
2 See Charles Cronin, I Hear America Suing: Music Copyright Infringement in the
Era of Electronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 1187, 1194 (2015) (suggesting that “[t]o
appreciate how far we have strayed from the early conception of copyright as a means to
counter wholesale copying of musical works, one must trace the evolution of case law in
this area before popular music became a significant U.S. ‘industry’”).
3 See Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1115.
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deemed the verdict an untenable and confusing precedent.4 They argued that
while the sound of the recorded performances of the songs share some
stylistic similarities, there was no meaningful similarity of original musical
expression.5
In a trenchant dissenting opinion, Judge Jacqueline Nguyen predicted
this verdict would inhibit the work of popular songwriters, making them
vulnerable to claims of misappropriation of unprotectable generic musical
elements and styles.6 Furthermore, she argued, a decision protecting such
elements could generate an absurd cascade of colorably legitimate
infringement claims.7 If Thicke and Williams could be found liable for using
generic musical and stylistic elements in earlier works by Marvin Gaye,
Gaye likewise could be deemed liable for having used generic elements
found in the songs of legions of songwriters preceding him.8
Those supporting the Williams v. Gaye verdict have proposed that it
exposed and remedied a long-standing disparity between copyright
protection afforded works of Black and White musicians.9 This disparity,
they claim, can be attributed to the judiciary’s obsolete perspective that the
protectable scope of a musical work is limited to original melodic, harmonic,
and rhythmic expression represented in visual notation.10
In this article, I suggest that this invocation of racial prejudice appears
to be a gambit to assert control over generic musical elements that copyright
was never intended to protect.11 I begin with a discussion of the development
of copyright protection for musical works, and how, over time, recording
technologies significantly affected the creation of popular musical
expression, and the means of protecting it. Then I consider whether and how
4 See Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861,
1865 (2018) (citing extensive press coverage supporting his claim that “[i]t’s tough to
overstate the amount of controversy that the case has generated”).
5 See id.
6 Gaye, 895 F.3d at 1141 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
7 See id. at 1152.
8 Id.
9 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Institute for Intellectual Property and Social
Justice Musician and Composers and Law, Music, and Business Professors in Support of
Appellees , Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-56880), 2019 U.S.
9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 2423, at *20 [hereinafter IIPSJ Brief]; Sean O’Connor et al.
“Blurred Lines” Ruling Brings Justice to Composers Like Marvin Gaye, SEATTLE TIMES
(May 6, 2018, 1:01 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/blurred-lines-rulingbrings-justice-to-composers-like-marvin-gaye/.
10 See id.
11 I subscribe to the American Psychological Association style guide’s policy that
“racial and ethnic groups are designated by proper nouns and are capitalized.” See Kwame
Anthony Appiah, The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black, THE ATLANTIC (June 18,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackandwhite/613159/ (arguing that “black and white are both historically created racial
identities, and whatever rule applies to one applies to the other”).
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the copyright interests of Black popular musicians have been unfairly
recognized because of the medium in which many recorded their musical
expression. I posit that the modes of creation and fixation used by musicians
of any race are irrelevant to the scope of protectable expression in a musical
work, and that the ambit of protectable musical expression readily can, and
should, be defined by its visual representation. I conclude by suggesting that
rather than expanding the scope of protectable musical expression to
encompass stylistic and sonic components, contracting it, and even limiting
protection for melody, would promote creation of innovative musical
expression, particularly in genres like jazz improvisations and spirituals
arrangements, to which Black musicians have contributed so significantly.

MUSIC, COPYRIGHT, AND TECHNOLOGY
Since revision in 1831, the United States’ copyright statute has
expressly protected musical works.12 This addition to protectable books,
maps and charts occurred a few years after Stephen Foster was born, and
before the enormous expansion later in the century of the sheet music
publishing industry.13 Over the nearly two hundred years that followed, the
scope and duration of statutory protection have grown inexorably, and now
provide authors exclusive rights, typically for a century or longer, not only
to copies of their musical compositions rendered in various media, but also
performances, arrangements, and other works derived from them.14
Until 1978, when the current U.S. Copyright Act became effective,
protection for published works was conditioned on the author or owner of
the work registering and depositing printed copies at the Copyright Office.15
To register copyrights in musical works applicants were required to submit
scores, sheet music, or lead sheets delineating the claimed protectable
musical expression in standard music notation.16
By the latter half of the twentieth century electric sound recording
technology had become increasingly effective, inexpensive, and
ubiquitous.17 This development made it possible for musically illiterate
performers to document their songs by simply recording their performances

12

Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
See generally, HARRY DICHTER & ELLIOTT SHAPIRO, EARLY AMERICAN SHEET
MUSIC: ITS LURE AND ITS LORE, 1768-1889 (1941).
14 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332.
15 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078.
16 See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that
under the 1909 Act, the Copyright Office Compendium of 1967 referred to deposits of
unpublished musical works as manuscripts).
17See
An
Audio
Timeline,
AUDIO
ENGINEERING
SOCIETY,
http://www.aes.org/aeshc/docs/audio.history.timeline.html (last updated June 13, 2014).
13
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of them. 18 The current copyright statute reflects the sea-change effected by
recording technology in the generation and recording of popular music.
Original musical works are now protected if they are “fixed in any tangible
means of expression,” and the Copyright Office accepts audio recordings as
deposits for registration of musical works.19 Congress also recognized, in
1971, the economic value of performances of musical works, and established
a separate copyright for sound recordings of them.20 Accordingly, if for
instance, Lady Gaga records Stephen Foster’s “Beautiful Dreamer,” she
would obtain a copyright for her recorded performance, but not for Foster’s
song, which is in the public domain.
Widespread consumer access to recording and synthetic sound
technologies also led to pandemic music illiteracy among popular
songwriters.21 The appeal of works of songwriters lacking the ability to
juggle complex combinations of musical parameters acquired through
musical literacy, tends to depend more on particular sounds and
performances than on their works’ typically exiguous musical content.22
Should we broaden the scope of protectable expression in popular music to
reflect this shift in the locus of its economic value from musical expression
to performance?

RACE AND COPYRIGHT FOR MUSICAL WORKS
Discussing “a legacy of unequal [copyright] protection” Professor K.J.
Greene identifies three reasons why he believes Black authors received “less
copyright protection”: “(1) inequalities of bargaining power (2) the clash
between the structural elements of copyright and the oral predicate of Black
culture, and (3) broad and pervasive social discrimination which both
devalued Black contributions to the arts and created greater vulnerability to
exploitation and appropriation of creative works.”23 The first and third of
these reasons are borne out by historical evidence.24 The second however, is
18 “Thanks to electricity, every consumer can be a producer…Rock’s electronic
instruments are easy to play and accessible to anyone who has the wherewithal to buy a
used Fender in a pawn shop.” ROBERT PATTISON, TRIUMPH OF VULGARITY: ROCK MUSIC
IN THE MIRROR OF ROMANTICISM 136 (1987).
19 See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registrations for Musical Compositions,
CIRCULAR, no. 50, Oct. 2019, at 1, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ50.pdf.
20 See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
21See Jon Henschen, The Tragic Decline of Music Literacy (and Quality),
INTELLECTUAL
TAKEOUT
(Aug.
16,
2018),
https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/article/tragic-decline-music-literacy-and-quality/.
22 See id. See also infra note 26 and accompanying discussion.
23 K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal
Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 356-57 (1999).
24 See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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more problematic, implying a monolithic Black musical culture that
copyright law cannot accommodate.
Since its inception in the early twentieth century the U.S. popular music
recording industry has differentiated its products by genre: “rhythm &
blues,” “hip-hop,” “disco,” as well as by social and racial characteristics of
anticipated consumers: “hillbilly”, “Western”, “race” (i.e., Black), “popular”
(i.e., White), etc.25 To capitalize on the potential appeal to White consumers
of works recorded by Black performers on “race” records, mainstream record
companies produced legally permissible “mirror” recordings of these works
marketed as “popular”.26 To promote the greatest number of sales among
White consumers, these companies capitulated to widespread Jim Crow
sentiment in the United States in first half of the century and engaged White
performers for these recordings.27
The unfairness of this practice was compounded by the companies’
arguably unwitting misappropriation of copyrightable musical expression
contained in recordings by Black performers. Professor Robert Brauneis has
discussed how Black performers in the first half of the twentieth century,
while performing musical numbers for recordings, often added significant
original musical expression of their own.28 Because these performers’
additional material was not submitted with the registration for the underlying
work, it devolved to the public domain by “divestitive” publication through
their recordings. White performers performed and recorded this additional
expression without compensating, or even acknowledging, its Black authors.
Particularly during the first half of the Twentieth Century, unscrupulous
music publishers and agents fraudulently obtained copyrights for works by
Black musicians, capitalizing on their lack of awareness of their rights; their
often-straitened finances; lack of verbal literacy; and by simple theft.29 White
musicians, particularly those from poor rural communities, also suffered
such unethical and illicit acts. The 1909 Act, effective at that time, did not
facilitate this conduct; in fact it promulgated civil and criminal penalties for
such deliberate infringements.30 Like many other outbreaks of unethical or

25 See William G. Roy, “Race Records” and “Hillbilly Music”: Institutional
Origins of Racial Categories in the American Commercial Recording Industry, 32
POETICS 265 (2004).
26 See Robert Brauneis, Copyright, Music, and Race: The Case of Mirror Cover
Recordings
7
(Jul.
22,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3591113 (mentioning that the
compulsory license provision in the Copyright Act of 1909 established the legality of this
practice).
27 See id. at 8.
28 See id. at 7.
29 See generally Greene, supra note 23.
30 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 25-28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081-82.
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illegal behavior, one can attribute this one to social ills like racism, poverty,
illiteracy, and unequal access to legal advice.
Nearly a century on, race continues to play a significant role in
marketing popular music. Today, however, White songwriters/performers no
longer eschew certain musical and stylistic elements commonly associated
with the works of Black songwriters/performers. Instead, Bruce Springsteen,
Justin Bieber, Justin Timberlake, Robin Thicke, and many other White pop
musicians calculatedly incorporate musical and stylistic elements, as well as
visual elements like dress and gestures, associated with Black culture, in
their songs, and their performances of them.31
Like the producers of White “mirrors” who profited from avoiding
stereotypical elements associated with performances by Black musicians, or
who incorporated only those elements considered appealing to mainstream
audiences, White musicians now profit by embracing them.32 One reason for
doing so is to flatter their White fans who believe that by appreciating and
purchasing recorded and live performances of musicians whose work
ostensibly demonstrates enlightened views about racial parity and
inclusivity, these attributes can be ascribed to them as well.33
There is little question that, particularly in the first half of the twentieth
century, Black songwriters suffered unequal copyright protection because of
racial prejudice, and illicit conduct by White music industry impresarios.
Next we consider the more difficult question whether bias against the
creative modes and media commonly ascribed to Black musicians has
contributed to this record of unequal protection.34
Those claiming that copyright law has inadequately protected musical
works by Black authors have based this assertion on arguments about the
collaborative ethos of composition among Black musicians;35 the emphasis
31See

PATTISON, supra note 18, at 44 (musing on the implications of a Bruce
Springsteen album cover with an image of the White Springsteen “recumbent upon”
Black saxophonist Clarence Clemons).
32 This embrace is underscored by use of stereotypical visual imagery associated
with Black performers captured in the audio-video recordings of choreographed
performances. E.g., Justin Timberlake, Like I Love You, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQ3slUz7Jo8.
33 British pop singers who perform with American accents have similar financial
motivations. Shunning the sound of English accents long associated with Victorian
primness in American popular entertainment, for example, MARY POPPINS (Walt Disney
Productions 1964), MY FAIR LADY (Warner Bros. 1964), THE KING AND I (20th CenturyFox)) they adopt mid- or low-brow American intonation and vernacular to profit from the
vulgarity and unrestraint they signal, which are essential to the merchantability of most
popular songs today. See PATTISON, supra note 18, at 151 et seq.
34 See GREENE, supra note 23, at 356.
35 See Elizabeth Rosenblatt, Copyright’s One-Way Racial Appropriation Ratchet,
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 605 (2019) (claiming “copyright disadvantages those whose
backgrounds and cultural forms embrace cumulative creation and oral transmission of
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Black musicians place on oral rather than written traditions;36 Black
musicians’ frequent borrowing of existing expression;37 and Black
musicians’ focus on performance rather than the underlying musical work.38
While Williams v. Gaye was under appeal, the Institute for Intellectual
Property and Social Justice submitted an amicus brief supporting the Gaye
family.39 Its authors repeatedly claim that the Copyright Office’s policy
prior to 1978, that applicants submit notated copies of musical works with
their applications was discriminatory.40
Until 1978 the Copyright Office would register only musical works
represented in visible notation.41 Black songwriters may have been less
likely than their White counterparts to be versed in music notation. This is
the basis of the argument of those claiming that this requirement reveals

creative techniques”). Ann Bartow makes a similar claim on behalf of women, that
copyright poorly accommodates communally created works like quilts, that are typically
associated with women. See Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism
and Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 573-74 (2006).
36 See GREENE, supra note 23, at 355, n.68 (noting that like indigenous folklore,
musical works by Black musicians were often fixed, and then claimed, by individuals
other than the authors).
37 See Olufunmilayo Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 622 (2006) (suggesting, for
instance, that “features associated with hip hop are intensive borrowing, which is at odds
with contemporary perceptions of composition that see borrowing as necessarily signaling
a lack of originality”).
38 See Larisa K. Mann, Decolonizing Copyright Law: Learning from the Jamaican
Street Dance 60 (Fall 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley), https://escholarship.org/content/qt7h8449q6/qt7h8449q6.pdf
(identifying
“syncretism and phonographic orality” as key characteristics of Jamaican music, neither
of which copyright accommodates).
39 See IIPSJ BRIEF, supra note 9.
40 “The Copyright Office’s former policy of requiring written music deposits
contravened the 1909 Act and also discriminated against traditionally marginalized
composers.” Id. at *11. “Composers not fluent in European staff notation, composers who
work in aural traditions and genres where such notation is not very helpful, and composers
from disadvantaged backgrounds have routinely been discriminated against by a
copyright system at times improperly administered so as to extend protection to only
certain kinds of privileged works.” Id. at *46-47. See also, Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 21, Skidmore v. Zeppelin 952 F. 3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-142) (claiming that
limiting protected musical expression to that recorded in music notation “will most
heavily impact historically disenfranchised communities (black blues artists, for
example…)”).
41 See Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound
Technology: Looking Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 1, 4 (2014) (“[Before the 1976 Copyright Act] musical compositions still needed
to be fixed in scores to gain copyright protection”). During the 1920s and 30s the
Copyright Office also accepted piano rolls as deposits for music registrations. See IIPSJ
Brief, supra note 9, at *22.
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copyright law’s bias favoring White authors.42 However, many White
popular songwriters active before 1978 also were incapable of writing or
reading music notation.43 Moreover, songwriters who are incapable of
writing music have long employed literate musicians to transcribe their
performances as sheet music and lead sheets.44 Perhaps access to these
transcribers by Black songwriters may have been more limited than that of
Whites, but such transcriptions have been used to register thousands of songs
by both Black and White authors.45
Those who claim that the earlier law’s visual representation
requirement discriminated against, or at least disadvantaged, Black
songwriters have suggested that by allowing audible media to be used to
register musical works, Black songwriters were, finally, able to obtain
copyright protection as readily as Whites.46 More problematically, they
claim that this broadening of acceptable media by which works may be
registered implies a broadening of the scope of protectable expression of
musical works fixed in audio recordings.47 In fact, there is no correlation

42 See IIPSJ BRIEF, supra note 9, at *22 (asserting that “the form-of-deposit
discrimination problem arose because many of our nation’s most gifted [and
internationally acclaimed] composers who worked outside of the European classical or
formal music tradition—albeit squarely within emerging twentieth century Western
popular music genres—were not fluent in European staff notation”).
43 Including Irving Berlin, Elvis Presley, The Beatles, and Bruce Springsteen.
David Galeson, From “White Christmas” to Sgt. Pepper: The Conceptual Revolution in
Popular Music, NBER WORKING PAPER 13308, August 2007, at 16, 23.
44 Irving Berlin, for instance, hired a musically literate pianist to realize and
“transcribe” his melodies. See ALEXANDER WOOLLCOTT, THE STORY OF IRVING BERLIN
37 (1925).
45 Marvin Gaye’s publisher employed a music transcriber to register copyrights
for his songs, including “Got to Give it Up”. See IIPSJ BRIEF, supra note 9, at *32. See
also Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1063 (rejecting Skidmore’s claim that limiting protection to
musical expression represented in visual notation disadvantaged musically illiterate
authors, noting that the author of the complaining work had no difficulty in obtaining or
paying for a transcription of the music in his recorded performance of it).
46 See Elizabeth Rosenblatt, Copyright’s One-Way Racial Appropriation Ratchet,
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 632-33 (2019) (suggesting that “[g]ranting protection to
sound recordings was certainly not all bad for creators of color, as it tended to counteract
some of the prejudices against non-notable works”).
47 The authors of the IIPSJ Brief argue that “[i]f Gershwin could notate for oldfashioned car squeeze bulbs as he did in “An American in Paris,” … and to which
presumably the copyright in that composition extends—why could Gaye not also enjoy
protection for his R&B or Soul orchestral composition as to the material executed by
cowbells and background voices?” IIPSJ BRIEF, supra note 9, at *49-50. In fact,
Gershwin’s use of a bulb horn, and Gaye’s use of a cowbell, are musical ideas, and not
protectable expression. Accordingly, when he used a bulb horn in his De Profundis for a
Speaking Pianist (1982) Frederic Rzewski did not have to obtain the Gershwin estate’s
authorization. Likewise, for example, Rossini’s well-known unusual use of the violin bow
(tapping bow sticks against music stands) in the overture to La scala de seta (1812) was
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between a work’s protectable expression and the medium in which it is
recorded. While the choice of medium may affect the type of expression
recorded, it does not bear on whether, or the extent to which, it is protectable.

SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR ORIGINAL MUSICAL
EXPRESSION
The U.S. Copyright Act identifies, but does not define, “musical works”
as a category of protectable expression.48 The Compendium of U.S.
Copyright Practices, however, which “provides expert guidance” on
copyright, identifies “main elements of copyrightable musical work
authorship [as] melody, rhythm, harmony, and lyrics, if any.”49 Of course,
musical works may also comprise many other elements like instrumentation,
dynamics, tempo, phrasing, etc. But the fact that the U.S. Copyright Office
did not include these within the “main elements” of musical works, implies
a hierarchy of significance among them that musicians have intuited from
time immemorial. They fall along a spectrum ranging between
sound/performance elements at one end, to more purely musical elements
like melody at the other. One can identify these poles as the how and the
what of music. Melody, for instance, lies on the what end of the spectrum,
whereas dynamics lie on the how side. Melody and harmony tell us what
notes to perform, while dynamics tell us how to perform them.50
This spectrum also indicates a hierarchy of dependency among musical
elements. The significance of dynamics, instrumentation, tempos, and even
the key of a song depends entirely upon its more fundamentally musical
elements of melody, harmony, and rhythm. Imagine a musical work
containing a tempo, meter, key, phrasings, instrumentation, and perhaps
even a verbal text, but no melody, rhythm, or harmony. The work is
meaningless because, apart from the words, it contains no information about
what to perform. Two high-profile copyright cases from over a century ago,
involving mechanical reproductions of musical works, are curiously relevant
on the issues of hierarchy and dependency among musical elements.
an idea that later composers could freely use. Only the particular rhythmic figure to which
Rossini applied the idea, might be considered protectable musical expression.
48 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
49 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. C OPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
802.3 (3d ed. 2017).
50 Aaron Keyt has alluded to the copyright significance of this spectrum when he
explains that musical works are not works of sound: “composers do not create sounds at
all; they create only musical structures which are revealed through sound." Copyrightable
expression in musical works, therefore, is based upon "what the sounds do, how they are
used, rather than what they are in acoustical terms.” Comment: An Improved Framework
for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 436-37 (1988).
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In 1899 English music publisher Boosey & Co. sued Whight, a
manufacturer of piano rolls, claiming Whight infringed the copyrights in a
number of works Boosey owned.51 Piano rolls are paper scrolls that have
been perforated to indicate the melody, harmony, and rhythm of a musical
work.52 These perforations can be “read” and then sounded by a mechanical
piano or organ, just as the tuned metal tines of a music box “read” melody,
harmony, and rhythm designated by the pins on the rotating metal barrel,
which they pluck.53
The court decided that piano rolls were not infringing because the
musical information recorded in their perforations is not intelligible to
humans in standard notation.54 But the rolls also provided printed verbal cues
about changes in speed and volume to be affected by the human operator of
the mechanical organ or piano playing the work. These dynamic and tempo
indications corresponded with those in Boosey’s sheet music. As these were
visually intelligible, the court concluded they did infringe.55 Accordingly,
while the court permitted the defendant to copy plaintiff’s most significant
musical information, it prohibited copying of its least essential and original
musical elements. Nearly a decade later, in a factually similar dispute
involving a music publisher named White-Smith, the United States Supreme
Court concluded likewise that unauthorized piano roll reproductions of
protected musical works were not infringing copies.56
Latent behind the tortured reasoning of both decisions was a last-minute
protocol to the Berne Copyright Convention of 1886, which established that
copies of copyrighted musical works that enabled mechanical renderings of
them, were not infringing.57 In the nineteenth century the Swiss were the
most important developers and manufacturers of music boxes (and watches
with similar mechanisms).58 It appears this Swiss industry capitalized upon
the goodwill from their nation’s convening and hosting the Convention, and

51

See Boosey v. Whight, 1 Ch. 836, (1899) (Eng.).
See generally, Thomas W. Patteson, Player Piano, O XFORD HANDBOOKS
ONLINE,
Nov.
2014,
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935321.001.0001/o
xfordhb-9780199935321-e-16.
53 Id.
54 See Boosey, 1 Ch. 836.
55 Id.
56 See White-Smith v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1907).
57 See BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF L ITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS (1886) 687 (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., Berne Primary Sources on
Copyright (1450-1900)), www.copyrighthistory.org.
58 See MUSICBOX INFOS, http://www.alscher.ch/en/musicbox_infos.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 2021).
52
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lobbied the other national participants to accommodate this curious
carveout.59
The player piano industry boomed in the first decade of the twentieth
century in the United States and in Europe, and sales of piano rolls
supplanted those of sheet music.60 To avert ruinous financial consequences
facing songwriters in the wake of the Boosey and White-Smith decisions, the
Berne Convention and the U.S. Copyright Act were amended at that time to
protect copyrighted musical works fixed in formats read by machines.61
The Boosey and White-Smith decisions are egregious for unfairly
limiting protection of songwriters’ most valuable expression, i.e. melody,
harmony, and rhythm. Cases like Williams v. Gaye, on the other hand, are
damaging because they expand protection beyond original musical
expression. Copyright should protect as music only original melodic,
rhythmic, and harmonic expression. Western notation most effectively and
efficiently records expression incorporating these fundamental musical
elements. Copyright should not protect particular dynamics, phrasing, tempi,
instrumentation, and other stylistic elements as music, because authors’
particular deployments of these elements evidences more non-protectable
ideas than it does protectable expression.
Legally protecting ideas defeats copyright’s fundamental objective to
incentivize the production of original expression, because it enables
monopolization of generic elements of musical, verbal, and visual
expression. For musicians, elements like instrumentation and dynamics are
akin to generic shapes and colors used by visual artists, or the punctuation
and emphases by which writers organize and inflect their words.
The fact that Jeff Koons may have been the first to render balloon
animals in shiny metal does not give him the right to prevent others from
similar play because they are only copying the earlier artist’s idea.62

59 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, T HE BERNE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS FROM 1886 TO 1986, 156 (1986)

(providing the report from the 1908 Berlin Convention that eliminated this carveout:
“[f]or tunes a certain degree of dispensation was introduced in the 1886 Final Protocol,
but this dispensation cannot extend beyond the terms that established it.”).
60 See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 31 (2000),
http://www.edwardsamuels.com/illustratedstory/isc2.htm.
61 See REVISED BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS OF NOV. 13, 1908 (1908), https://www.keionline.org/wpcontent/uploads/1908_Berne_Convention.pdf; Copyright Act of 1909 §12, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909).
62 “Why is ‘Balloon Dog' . . . said to be by Jeff Koons? Mr. Koons did not
conceive the original balloon figure of a dog, nor did he create the gigantic finished
piece, made by Carlson & Company. Mr. Koons simply found something to duplicate
and suggested making it big and shiny.” Peter E. Rosenblatt, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
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Likewise, the distinctive onomatopoeia and extravagant punctuation
associated with the style of the late Tom Wolfe, are unprotected ideas by
which he inflected original strings of words by which he created
copyrightable literary expression.63 Literary elements like punctuation,
emphases, and diacritical marks enrich the meaning of these sequences, but
have no literary significance independent of them. Musical elements like
dynamics, performing styles, tempos, and instrumentation similarly enhance
the melodies, harmonies and rhythms to which they are applied, but have no
independent musical significance.

MORE LIMITED PROTECTION FOR MELODY
The IIPSJ Brief amici argued that using recorded performances, rather
than visual notation, to determine the scope of a work’s original musical
expression, would promote more equitable protection of musical works.64
This approach would permit non-musically literate songwriters in particular,
to protect instrumentation, styles, timbres, and other secondary musical
elements in their recorded songs.65 As mentioned earlier, in her Williams v.
Gaye dissent, Judge Jacqueline Nguyen discredited this suggestion when she
observed that expanding protection to previously unprotectable elements
ultimately only increases the potential infringement liability of those
asserting ownership of these musical ideas.66
In fact, American songwriters and musicians, musically literate or
otherwise, would benefit from a narrower view of protectable musical
expression which, under certain circumstances, might not even encompass
melody. Melody is the most memorable and identifiable component of most
musical works. To recall or communicate a popular song we cannot hum its
harmony; we might tap a brief rhythmic figure from it, but more typically
we will hum its melody, which conjures both the rhythm and harmony (and
words) of the song.
In his examination of the long-standing primacy of melodic similarity
in adjudication of music copyright infringement disputes, Professor Joseph
Fishman observes that “[t]he notion that melody today is the primary locus
of music's value, however defined, is a fiction.”67 This is true, but the fact

TIMES (May 4, 2008), https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage990DE1DD1230F937A35756C0A96E9C8B63.html.
63 See Dexter Schraer, Recommended: Tom Wolfe, 70 THE ENG. J. 49 (1981)
(characterizing Wolfe’s stringing together long lists of hyphenated words as a “rhetorical
trick”).
64 See IIPSJ Brief, supra note 9, at *50.
65 Id.
66 895 F.3d 1106, 1141 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
67 Fishman, supra note 4, at 1904.
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that melody may no longer be the engine of economic value in popular songs
does not mean that other musical components have assumed this role. This
is certainly true of so many popular songs today, whose financial success
depends mainly upon the appeal of the songwriters/performers, and audio
and video engineers’ artful massaging of their recorded performances into
marketable products.68 In other words, the relative importance of various
compositional components (melody, timbre, style, etc.) to a work’s musical
value does not vary. Even if, for instance, electronically generated
background timbres, or distinctive vocal technique, or clever lyrics, generate
most of the appeal of a popular song, this fact does not elevate the musical
significance of these attributes.
Professor Fishman argues that courts’ ongoing focus on melody, despite
its lessened significance in much popular music, remains useful because this
“unidimensional” test provides a degree of predictability in music
infringement disputes that is not available in claims involving other
copyrightable works.69 But courts’ persistent emphasis on melodic similarity
in adjudicating infringement claims has been beneficial also because it has
prevented monopolization of secondary musical, and sonic, elements,
despite the fact that these elements may generate most of the economic value,
and even aesthetic appeal, of a popular song.
The judiciary’s longstanding view that melody is the most protectable
component of a musical work, however, is troublesome in connection with
two musical genres to which Black musicians have made such significant
contributions: jazz, and spiritual arrangements. Both genres incorporate
existing melodic material from public domain or copyrighted works.70 The
authors’ objective in both genres is to recontextualize the preexisting
melody; often to outdo the author of the original musical context in virtuosity
and complexity, even to the extent that the preexisting material may be no
longer, or only faintly, perceptible.71 Works of jazz in particular vary
“The significance of those manipulating electrical knobs and sliders to the
appeal of a live performance or recording is obvious when one considers the consequence
of their absence, along with that of the electricity that powers their mixers, amplifiers, and
speakers . . . sound engineers manipulate the recorded and amplified sounds of voices of
performers like Madonna, Kanye West, Miley Cyrus, and Justin Timberlake to ensure
their appeal to mainstream taste. Of course, the appeal of the vocal rendering of these
stars also depends greatly on their physical appearance; if Justin Timberlake gained 100
pounds his voice might improve, but it is safe to assume that his earnings from [audiovideo recordings of performances made while obese] would worsen.” Cronin, supra note
2, at 1225.
69 See Fishman, supra note 4, at 1908-09.
70 See Sandra Jean Graham, Spiritual, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2020); DARIUSZ
TEREFENKO, JAZZ THEORY: FROM BASIC TO ADVANCED STUDY, 251 et seq. (2d ed. 2017).
71 See Mark Tucker & Travis A. Jackson, Jazz, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2020).
(noting how in “‘cutting contests’ musicians took turns building long, virtuosic solos
designed to impress or outdo opposing players.”).
68
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considerably in the degree to which they depart from the musical context of
the original melody;72 the same is true of classical music’s theme-andvariation format.73
The fact that jazz and spiritual arrangements plainly incorporate
existing melodies raises the question whether, under copyright law, they are
derivative or transformative works. The Copyright Statute defines derivative
works, but not transformative works.74 Unauthorized works that incorporate
another’s copyrighted expression are only deemed “transformative” if they
can be accommodated under the “fair use” provision of the Copyright
Statute.75 A significant body of case law has addressed the question of what
makes a work “transformative”, which has engendered predictable
uncertainty and complexity as how best to answer it.76
The creator of a derivative work must first obtain authorization from
the owner of the underlying work.77 This authorization commonly involves
financial consideration.78 The author of a transformative work, on the other
hand, is not required to obtain such authorization so long as he creates
“something new, with a further purpose or different character, [that does] not
substitute for the original use of the work.”79 This definition nicely describes
the objective of most jazz musicians performing “standards”.80 However,
because these “standards” are often melodies of well-known copyrighted
songs, jazz works that allude to them have typically been considered
derivative of them.81
72

See id.
See Elaine Sisman, Variations, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2001) (identifying many
types of variations like “ostinato”, “constant harmony”, “melodic outline”, “fantasy” that
vary significantly in the extent they depart from the musical context of the original
melody).
74 Derivative works are “based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed or adapted.” Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2018).
75 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
76 See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2019) (analyzing the disparate views of
many court opinions that have dealt with this issue since Federal Judge Pierre Leval
coined the term in his Harvard Law Review article in 1990).
77 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
78 See Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and That Ain’t Good, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1940, 1945 (2005).
79 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE FAIR USE INDEX; MORE INFORMATION ON FAIR USE
(2020), https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/moreinfo.html#:~:text=Transformative%20uses%20are%20those%20that,purpose%20of%20
encouraging%20creative%20expression.
80 Note, supra note 78, at 1942 (noting that jazz standards are those pieces "that a
professional musician may be expected to know”).
81 Id. (“These standards, also referred to as ‘mainstream standards’, were generally
written in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s for film and Tin Pan Alley or Broadway musicals by
73
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Like jazz numbers, arrangements of spirituals borrow preexisting
melodies (and words), and therefore they too may be considered derivative
rather than transformative of them.82 Because the melodies incorporated into
spirituals arrangements are from African American religious folksongs
originating between the late-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries,
however, they are in the public domain, and arrangers do not need to obtain
authorization to incorporate them into their works.83 While authors of
spirituals arrangements cannot prevent other arrangers from keying off the
same religious folksongs, they can prevent others from copying their original
musical recontextualizations of these folksongs, which copyright protects.84
Under the compulsory license provision of the U. S. Copyright Act
anyone may arrange and record a musical work for which the copyright
owner has already released a sound recording, as long as the arrangement
does not change the melody or “fundamental character of the work.”85 It is
peculiar, therefore, that jazz musicians typically rely upon compulsory
licenses to use these “standards” given that jazz arrangements invariably
change both the melody and the fundamental character of the popular songs
that inspired their creation. 86 Unlike arrangers of spirituals, however, jazz
musicians’ copyright interest in their musical recontextualizations depends
on terms established with the owner of the “standard”.87
There is no clear delineation between derivative and transformative
musical works, but the greater the extent to which the value of a later work
depends upon preexisting musical expression, the more we should regard it
as derivative rather than transformative, of the preexisting expression. Piano
reductions of operas, symphonies, ballets, etc., for instance, are very useful,
but they are highly derivative because their value as musical works depends
almost entirely on preexisting expression.88 On the other hand, while
preexisting melodies may be the spark behind many jazz improvisations and
arrangements of spirituals, the musical value of these works is generated

non-jazz musicians such as George Gershwin, Cole Porter, and Harold Arlen. Thus, jazz
performers are typically not the copyright owners of the very pieces that undergird the
jazz canon”).
82 See Graham, supra note 70.
83See African American Spirituals, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PERFORMING ARTS
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.loc.gov/item/ihas.200197495/.
84 See Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors,
Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241, 248
(1996) (noting that “nothing in an arrangement of a public domain music composition is
protected unless it qualifies as a ‘derivative work.’”).
85 17 U.S.C. § 115.
86 See Note, supra note 78 at 1945.
87 See id.
88 See David Charlton & Kathryn Whitney, Score, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2020).
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almost entirely by the later musician,89 and we should, accordingly, regard
these works as transformative per se.90
For centuries composers have used preexisting melodies as the generic
kernels of transformative theme-and-variations and, more recently, jazz
improvisations, and choral arrangements.91 These musical metamorphoses
can be so artful and complex that the original melodies are rendered
essentially foils that reflect the later musician’s virtuosity. 92 More
significantly, these later works do not undermine, but typically enhance, the
value we ascribe to the works whose melodies they incorporate.93
The same would be true of a hypothetical improvisation by Winton
Marsalis on “Let it Go” from Disney’s Frozen. Disney might be pleased if
Winton Marsalis publicly performed and recorded this improvisation, but it
would undoubtedly be more than displeased if Marsalis did not first obtain
the company’s authorization and agree to give Disney a portion of the profits
from his performances and recordings. Disney’s legal capacity to compel
Marsalis to do so based upon the entrenched notion that his improvisation is
a derivative rather than a transformative work, is paradoxical and unfair
given that his recording would only enhance the reputation and profitability
of Disney’s song.

89 The late Moses Hogan, a classmate of mine at Oberlin years ago, became well
known for the spirituals arrangements he wrote in the tragically few, but enormously
productive, years he lived following his formal education. While the melodies and words
of public domain spirituals were the wellspring of Hogan’s work, the vocal scores in
which he documented his reworkings evidence brilliant original melodic, harmonic, and
rhythmic expression. This expression’s value is manifest by the enduring appeal of his
works; there are hundreds of other arrangements of well-known spirituals, but few are
performed, as often (or as globally) as Hogan’s. Drawing on knowledge acquired at
Oberlin (and later Juilliard) he wrought original musical expression far more complex
than, yet reverential toward, the underlying works. Copyright provided incentives and
rewards by giving him the exclusive right to copy and perform his arrangements, but it
did not limit others’ use of the underlying public domain spirituals that inspired his work.
See generally, Anne Shelley, Moses Hogan, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (2012).
90 “Jazz musicians and aficionados rarely care what actual piece is being played they care how it is played and by whom. The underlying song is simply a vehicle for
showcasing the musician's true ideas and spontaneous compositions.” Note, supra note
78, at 1952.
91 See Sisman, supra note 73.
92 Beethoven’s 33 Variations on a Waltz by Diabelli is one of the best-known
examples of this phenomenon. See MAYNARD SOLOMON, BEETHOVEN 347 (Schirmer
Books et. al. 2d rev. ed. 1998).
93 For example, the fact that Frank Churchill’s “Someday My Prince Will Come”
(Snow White) has remained well known since it was first heard in 1937, can be attributed,
at least in part, to popular arrangements of it by Miles Davis, David Brubeck, Wynton
Kelly, and many other jazz musicians. See Stories of Standards: “Someday My Prince
Will Come,” KUVO (2019), https://www.kuvo.org/stories-of-standards-someday-myprince-will-come/.
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CONCLUSION
Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams did not appeal the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to the Supreme Court, so the Williams v. Gaye jury verdict can never
be directly overturned.94 In recent decisions favoring defendants Led
Zeppelin and Katy Perry, however, courts have averted the pernicious
implications of Williams v. Gaye.95 In both cases the courts dwelt on the
limited scope of protection for works with “thin” copyrights, signaling the
judiciary’s increasing skepticism towards infringement claims based on
similar stylistic, acoustical, and secondary musical elements.96
I have argued here furthermore that copyright’s objectives would be
better served if only virtually identical unauthorized copies of even primary
musical elements, including melody, were considered infringing.
Accordingly, an unauthorized piano score that faithfully and fully
reproduces the principal musical elements of a protected symphonic work
would be infringing.97 On the other hand, arrangements, fantasies, variations,
etc. that are inspired by and allude to principal musical elements of a
protected work should be considered transformative works, which not only
do not compete with the earlier work in the market but, in fact, promote it.
Virtually all music infringement disputes could be dismissed if courts
recognized copyrightable musical expression as limited to melody, harmony,
94 See Joshua Rosenberg, Controversial ‘Blurred Lines’ Suit Ends in $5 Million
Verdict,
FORBES
(Dec.
14,
2018,
6:51
PM
EST)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2018/12/14/controversial-blurredlines-suit-ends-in-5-million-verdict/#32de4c2b6ffe.
95 See Gray v. Perry, No. 15-CV-05642-CAS-JCx, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46313
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020); Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020). The
plaintiffs in both cases appealed these decisions, Gray to the Ninth Circuit and Skidmore
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Gray’s appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit; the U.S.
Supreme Court denied Skidmore’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 5, 2020.
96 See Gray, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10-11 (Federal Judge Christina Snyder
referring to Zeppelin to support her determination that only a “virtually identical”
defending work may infringe a work with “thin” copyright protection).
97 One does not need to obtain authorization to create a derivative work based
upon an underlying work in the public domain. However, an underlying work may be in
the public domain in one country but still protected in others. Pianist Yuja Wang painfully
learned of such discrepancies when publisher Boosey & Hawkes, owner of the copyright
to Stravinsky’s Le sacre du printemps, forbade her performance of a faithful arrangement
of it for piano and percussion that she had programmed for a number of dates in Europe.
Le Sacre was published in 1921; as a Russian work it immediately entered the public
domain in the U.S. Many European countries, however, extended the term of copyright
protection for works published during and between the world wars, and in these countries
Le sacre will be protected until 2056. See Olivier Vrins, Yuja Wang Barred from Playing
an Arrangement of Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring in Europe, ALTIUS BLOG, (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.altius.com/blog/433/yuga-wang-barred-from-playing-an-arrangement-ofstravinsky-s-rite-of-spring-in-europe.
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and rhythm, and that the medium in which a musical work is fixed should
not affect the scope of its protection. While the contents of all genres of
expression, and the media in which they are recorded, continually evolve,
the scope of their copyrightable expression does not. Otherwise, copyright’s
objective to incentivize original expression would be compromised through
inhibiting uncertainty. Because of the regrettable broadening of the scope of
protectable expression promulgated by dispositions of various infringement
disputes over the past few decades, American popular songwriters now face
such uncertainty. Only courts can dispel this incertitude by limiting this
scope, even excluding melody in cases involving transformative works, to
restore the healthy cross-pollination of styles and genres that has always
characterized American popular music.

